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GROUPS AS A MEANS OR AN END?  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE 
PROMOTION OF COOPERATION IN GHANA 
Abstract 
In the past two decades there has been a growing emphasis within the 
international development industry on promoting group activity. This paper 
charts how interpretation of the loose concept of social capital has shaped donor 
and NGO discourses on, and their preoccupation with, groups. Donors are using 
blueprints of group cooperation in an asocial and aspatial manner that ignores 
local specificities of place, space and cultural context. An empirical case is 
examined that demonstrates how donor discourse is reinterpreted, translated 
and even rejected by players at different spatial scales. The reasons for the 
continued donor preoccupation with groups in the face of local resistances are 
explored.  
 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with competing discourses and actions around grass-roots 
group developmental activities and associated concepts of social capital.  Group 
developmental activities seem to lie at the heart of multilateral and bilateral donors' 
recent attachment to social capital and their application of social capital concepts as a 
development tool.  “Group based projects in general are increasingly being accepted 
as a means to advocate organizational capabilities of poor people”, a response to state 
and market failures in the provision of essential public goods (Weinberger and 
Jutting, 2001:1392).  Local Development Groups (LDGs) are widely conceived by 
donors as a means of building on local traditions of organisational life - 'good culture' 
- in poor countries, and thereby finding a route to more ordered (and efficient) 
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imaginaries of development, challenging and reconfiguring local political and 
economic relations.  However, there are substantial differences between donor 
conceptions of groups' developmental potential (and its sub-text of efficient delivery) 
and how these conceptions are translated, reinterpreted and rejected in different ways 
at different spatial scales along the development chain linking donors to the grass-
roots. This issue has not received adequate attention in recent analyses of international 
development discourse.  
 The discourses on groups have been reinforced by crude studies of the 
nebulous concept of social capital.  These equate the term to the number of 
community groups in a locality, with the assumption that more groups result in greater 
social capital.  It might be argued that social capital is a useful concept for 
development, simply because it brings the social context to the foreground 
(Fukuyama, 2001).  However, the evidence we examine in this paper shows how the 
social context is ignored in practice, supporting the view of Fine (2002:797) who 
emphasises that “social capital is ahistorical and asocial, so it is complicit with 
mainstream economics”.  Furthermore, we suggest that the concept of social capital 
being applied by donors and many NGOs is also frequently used in an aspatial 
manner.   We take the case of recent donor activity around LDGs and their grass-roots 
impact in Ghana to illustrate our perspective that space, place and cultural context, 
through their interplay with local political economy, may play an important role in 
determining whether group formation occurs in the first place, whether formation 
leads on to actual group developmental activities, and whom within and outside the 
group reaps benefits in the short and the longer term.   
 The term 'group', like 'community', suggests a notion of togetherness: common 
aims and a potential for concerted action.  But just as the concept of 'community' is no 
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longer accepted at face value, the fashion for working with groups needs careful 
examination.  Indeed, donor and NGO attachment to formal community groups may 
be a distraction from development initiatives, rather than an important mobilising 
component.  Much more attention must be given to the geographical, cultural and 
political contexts in which civil society develops and groups are embedded and have 
to operate.  As Bebbington (2000) argues, a spatialised understanding is needed 
whereby people are not simply viewed as detached recipients of external assistance, 
but as active and knowing agents in their own well-being. However, donor 
preoccupation with simplistic ‘blueprints’ of groups are seen by some commentators 
to be firmly wedded to and embedded in a neo-liberal project which has 
homogenization and rapid disbursement of funds as its prime target and, indeed, in its 
most damning interpretation (Hearn, 1999; Townsend et al., 1999: 49), may actually 
require cultural misreading and spatial blindness.   
 Our study focuses on Ghana, a heavily donor-dependent country. Here, since 
the mid 1990s, a homogenising discourse around the country’s rich traditional 
associational life and the consequent potential central development role for civil 
society organisations seems to be being promoted by donors (led by the World Bank) 
and accepted by most local NGOs. However, the realities on the ground are highly 
complex due to the diversity of social, cultural and political contexts and the specifics 
of location. In particular, this paper examines the spatial nature of rurality in shaping 
forms of cooperation. Drawing on a case study from our joint and individual 
qualitative research studies over the last six years in Ghana (including interviews with 
beneficiary groups, non-beneficiaries, community-based organisations (CBOs), local 
and international NGOs, district administrations and other government staff), we 
show that development groups initiated or supported by donors and their local agents 
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are prone to fail in particular places, because local (geographically and historically 
specific) conditions are unconducive to their sustenance.  Where groups are sustained 
their survival can be similarly attributed to place-specific factors such as common 
cultural norms, ethnicity and local gender relations, the ability to access resources and 
the long-term presence of committed and entrepreneurial individuals (whose actions 
are embedded in their particular social context and experiences).  
 With respect to these issues, this paper sets out to explore two major 
questions: how have the interpretations of social capital shaped donor discourses and 
preoccupation with groups; and how does space, place and cultural context shape how 
the discourse on groups is translated, reinterpreted and rejected in practice.  Greater 
understanding of both these issues is used to explore the reasons why donors are not 
more responsive to space, place and cultural context: the limited geographical 
imagination of donor discourses around LDGs is a major theme. The paper examines 
these questions at a range of spatial scales. The first section explores the discourses 
found amongst donors and international organisations around groups and social 
capital.  This is followed by an examination of how donor discourses of group 
development are interpreted at a national scale and sub-national/regional scale, taking 
the example of Ghana. A case study is used to demonstrate how place, space and 
culture in specific localities can influence the way development intervention is 
shaped, manipulated and even rejected.  We return to the issue of donor 
responsiveness to space and culture at the end of the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 5 
Donor discourses on social capital and group developmental activities: the limits 
to donor geographical imagination 
Although the development preoccupations of the World Bank and other policy makers 
have changed over the last fifty years, the tendency to define development problems 
as ‘natural’ rather than political (Mitchell, 1995:139), and thus to ignore issues of 
powerlessness  and social inequality were, for much of this time, a constant backdrop.   
From this perspective, their increasing interest in the developmental potential of social 
capital over the last decade might seem an encouraging step forward: a new 
recognition of the potential role of local society in overcoming developmental 
hurdles. Indeed, social capital has become one of the central organising themes in 
global development work, warmly welcomed by donors as a means of harnessing 
underlying social forces and energy in society and thus correcting for state and market 
failures by improving welfare and performance (Barr and Toye, 2000; DeFilippis, 
2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002).  Within this paradigm, membership of groups is 
commonly argues as being crucial to building trust and social cohesion (Weinberger 
and Jutting 2001: 1395)    
However, contemporaneously, the local development group (like the image of 
the African woman burdened by loads and the child on her back) seems to have 
become imagined by donors as an object that exists apart from the discourse that 
describes it, to be used and manipulated to construct the idea of a self-contained 
object, ripe for, and worthy of, support and transformation (Mitchell, 1995: 148; 
Schroeder 1999: 5,6). Mitchell (1995:149), following Chatterjee (1993), argues that 
development discourse practices a “necessary self-deception”, so that donors ignore 
their own central role in shaping configurations of power within the country they are 
supposedly developing: “detached   discourse wishes to present itself as a detached 
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centre of rationality and intelligence.  The relationship between the West and non-
West will be constructed in these terms…… Development discourse needs an object 
that appears to stand outside itself’” (ibid: 156).  The object of development is then 
co-opted as development agencies reinscribe critical discourses (such as the need to 
engage with civil society) with new political meanings, so that they can “claim a 
commitment to progressive ideals without significantly altering many of their basic 
practices” (Schroeder, 1999: 133).  
    The preoccupation with group formation is widely evident in Bank and 
other donor reports of the later 1990s.  Harriss (2002b:493) suggests the 1997 World 
Bank publication ‘Social Capital, the missing link’ marks the start of this trajectory, 
which gathered pace very rapidly.  The 1998/99 World Development Report (World 
Bank, 1998), for instance, has a section (p. 121) “Working through local channels and 
earning people's trust”: this focuses almost exclusively on working through local 
groups. Group membership is directly equated with social capital:  “To measure the 
density and importance of social connections in rural Tanzania in 1995, researchers 
asked households to list the groups they belonged to…They then constructed an index 
of social capital incorporating various aspects of membership…. Villages rich in 
social capital had higher incomes than those with little.  They were also much more 
likely to use fertilizer, agrochemical inputs, and improved seeds." (World Bank, 
1998:121).  
The reality of donor interest in group formation seems to have become much 
more firmly tied to the potential for groups to allow rapid disbursement of funds 
rather than the growth of social capital.  In many projects across the world there are 
quotas for group formation and a 'scramble for groups' consequently ensues (e.g. 
Mishra et al., in press; Quirk, 2003: 156-61; both writing about India; Joshi, 1998, on 
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Nepal). The gap between rhetoric and reality is particularly evident in micro-finance 
programmes which have been growing in popularity since the mid-1990s (Mayer and 
Rankin 2002: 805). Where donors commonly emphasise the positive side of social 
capital within (virtuous) groups by focussing on trust and empowerment, , 
implementing agencies at the local level (such as local NGOs and district 
administrations) are more likely to acknowledge culturally-defined sanctions and 
shame as the crucial attributes for group sustainability and the meeting of (donor 
established) targets (Porter, 2003).   
 Both donors and grass-roots organisers, moreover, often ignore broader 
dimensions of group formation: notably, firstly the exclusive nature of groups, which 
can increase inequalities within communities and even within groups themselves 
(especially when programmes are captured by local elites and/or their clients), and 
secondly, those elements of social capital which lie partially or wholly outside formal 
groups (Mayoux, 2001; Weinberger and Jutting, 2001; Conning and Kevane, 2002; 
Harriss 2002a:9).  The tendency of donors to pursue ‘development’ while exhibiting 
extreme blindness to local politics and inequalities is hardly new, of course (see 
Ferguson’s 1990study of the impact of the World Bank and other donors in Lesotho). 
 There is growing evidence both within the West African sub-region and 
beyond it that donor pressures for group formation can have untoward and 
unanticipated consequences. The micro-relations of trust and power which work both 
within, between and outside groups are of crucial significance in shaping the positive 
and/or negative trajectories of their wider impact (Mercer 1999; Mayoux 2001; 
Hickey, 2002).  Even when groups survive and there are positive economic 
consequences, there may be subsequent problems when their achievement is seen as a 
threat to community structure.  In Sierra Leone, for instance, an FAO project which 
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organised women vegetable growers into groups to send vegetables down to Freetown 
led to considerable internal differentiation among the groups and a backlash within 
the community which took the form of a witch hunt (Momsen, 2001, citing Bode, 
1995 and two other cases, one in Guyana, another in Sri Lanka).   Gideon (2001), 
reporting on women's health groups in Chile, points to particular difficulties around 
sustainability of women's groups which rely on unpaid labour, even if they are self-
initiated: women may lose the energy to maintain commitment over a long period, 
because of their family responsibilities and paid work commitments. Many groups 
simply use community labour power to get jobs done, and fail to find means by which 
they can integrate with the formal sector.  
 Some effort is made to address this kind of criticism in the World 
Development Report 2002 (World Bank, 2002), which explicitly notes the 
discrimination faced by those denied access to networks, and the potential for this to 
happen for particular groups such as the poor, isolated people, and ethnic minorities 
(174-5).  However, the rider that “in such cases there is a clear need for good formal 
institutions”, which is developed to a limited extent in the following sections (176-7), 
arguably does not adequately address these issues, as the constraints on access are 
both structural and spatial, and there is a need for access to informal institutions as 
well. 
Returning to the first of the two questions we set out on page 2, namely how 
the interpretations of social capital have shaped donor discourses and preoccupation 
with groups, it would seem that social capital has been simplistically (and 
conventiently) conceptualized by donors as the productive value of ‘togetherness’: the 
whole as greater than the sum of the parts. The concept of the ‘group’ supports this 
notion of togetherness: common aims and a potential for concerted action, while also 
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enabling more deep-seated donor concerns to maintain control.  The LDG has thus 
been constituted as an object by which local development can be managed (and 
control maintained) by donors while promulgating notions of ‘partnership’, another 
currently popular term in the development lexicon. Unlike other related but broader 
concepts which may also permeate development discourses,  such as social class, 
nation or community, the local development group appears to constitute a more 
manageable, cohesive entity.  Through our case study we will show how this potential 
has been tapped into in Ghana not only by donors, but also by International NGOs, 
local NGOs and by national and local government, all of which are, ultimately, highly 
dependent for their survival on donor funds and consequently mindful of the 
accountability that donors require of them.  
Our case study not only charts how donors and other have pursued the LDG as 
a development tool in Ghana, but focuses on the way geography inserts a powerful, 
yet seemingly unanticipated, complication into this process.  Throughout the 
discussion a major theme will be the limited geographical imagination of donor 
discourses concerning LDGs and their consequent failure in certain locational 
contexts in Ghana.  It can be argued that this is directly attributable to limitations of 
the social capital literature which has not only failed to give adequate consideration to 
the importance of history (a now widely accepted criticism) but also neglects the 
crucial significance of geography.  We suggest that the potential to build social capital 
is highly dependent on locational context, in ways that have been little explored in the 
literature.  Agro-ecological conditions, associated prevailing livelihood practices and 
opportunities, population densities, remoteness, proximity to smaller and larger urban 
centres, transport accessibility, (temporary, seasonal and permanent) migration 
patterns, and a range of other (sometimes highly localized) economic or socio-cultural 
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factors such as female seclusion, gender relations and matri- or patrilocality, have the 
potential to either support or destabilize social relations in simple or complex ways, 
predisposing people to accept or reject group projects.  Building trust (and so-called 
social capital) commonly hinges on conscious calculation and habitual action: 
developing an intimate knowledge of people’s character, personal and family 
circumstances, being able to monitor their actions and test them gradually over time, 
and, most critically, knowing where to find them if trust is misplaced and sanctions 
have to be imposed.  We can hypothesise that cooperation between non-family groups 
and group action in response to external development interventions is likely to be 
stronger where local options are limited by local agro-ecological conditions and 
conditions favour close and regular interactions.  All of the factors listed above have 
an inherently spatial component which may either favour or disfavour group action. 
We explore the way such factors interact to shape patterns of cooperation in different 
regions of Ghana in subsequent sections of this paper.  
    
Donors’ preoccupation with group formation in Ghana  
This section explores how donor discourses around social capital have shaped 
development interventions in Ghana.  Preoccupation with development through 
community groups has been widespread among donors and NGOs in Ghana for many 
years (village community organizations were the focus of Ghana’s early 90s IDA-
funded Agricultural Sector Investment Project, for instance),  but has become more 
pronounced over the last decade.  “Non governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
community groups have specific roles in brokering communication between the state 
and people” a DFID Ghana country strategy paper (November 1998: 4) observes, 
subsequently pointing to the many civil society organisations, including Church-based 
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groups, which deliver services in Ghana.  Ghana's state decentralisation progamme (in 
place since 1988) has strongly encouraged this emphasis on locally based 
development, which has come increasingly to be seen as simply working through 
LDGs.   
 In recent years most NGOs in Ghana have focussed the majority of their 
activities on groups.  NGO work with grass roots organisations is presented by donors 
as a crucial component in the strengthening of liberal democracy and democratic 
development, both widening and deepening the possibilities for citizen participation 
and simultaneously representing the interests of marginalised communities, 
campaigning on their behalf (Mercer, 2002).  In practice (in response to donor 
demands), numbers of group members and loan recovery have become more 
prominent NGO targets in Ghana than real improvement in living conditions or 
participation.   To quote merely from their own published reports, one local NGO in 
northern Ghana puts “promote group organisation and development” first among the 
specific objectives in its constitution.  Another local service NGO's northern office 
lists among its projections for 1998, “groups will be made to undertake compulsory 
saving to help them mobilize funds for the future” and assesses that “loan-recovery 
for the twenty (20) groups XXX manages was as high as 95%” (annual report, 1997), 
while a small INGO in northern Ghana boasts, “over the whole year we have worked 
with 80 groups” (annual review, 1998).   
 Experience in the micro-credit sector in Asia seems to have a particularly 
strong impact on donor ideology about groups in Ghana, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa, despite the fact that there is now a substantial literature which queries the 
overall impact of such programmes for women (see  www.id21.org/getweb/s6cjh1g1.html  - 
last accessed 30 January 2003).  The Grameen bank in Bangladesh, in particular, is 
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still commonly held up as a successful model, though the importance of peer pressure 
is explicitly recognised in this context (World Development Report, 1998:125; 2002: 
174).   In Ghana the application of such Asian models has been attributed by local 
academics to a lack of confidence in local ideas and identified as a factor which 
actually undermines local potential for change (Porter, 2003).  Senior figures in major 
local NGOs talk about being “rolled over” by donors because they lack the formal 
evidence (i.e. support from academic writings in international publications) to support 
their local perspectives. 
 The World Bank and government agencies appear to have developed a 
perspective that they must work with pre-formed groups, on the (often correct) basis 
that groups will otherwise simply be formed in order to capture funds.  There is logic 
in the perspective that those who have already formed and participated in groups are 
more likely to participate in new donor-supported groups specifically focussed on 
development.  This has been supported by empirical work in Chad and 
Kashmir/Pakistan (Weinberger and Jutting, 2001) and in southern Ghana (Lyon, 
1999).   
 Ghana is widely recognised and presented as a country with a rich traditional 
associational life (Atingdui et al., 1998), and thus might well be expected to present a 
fertile seedbed for donor group-based initiatives.  However, important spatial 
distinctions can be drawn, for instance between northern and central Ghana and the 
coastal zone.  This shapes how the discourse of groups affects interventions on the 
ground in each region.  These distinctions are arguably inadequately recognised by 
both donors and NGOs.  We briefly outline these broad regional differences and the 
spatial pattern of donor intervention in Ghana before moving on to a detailed case 
study in the coastal region. 
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In the 1980s and 90s northern Ghana became the site of the majority of 
international and local NGO activity in Ghana, because of its chronic poverty and 
limited infrastructural development.  (In the colonial era, this region was viewed 
principally as a labour reserve for southern gold mines and cocoa farms.) Initially 
assistance was focused on basic service delivery, though following the mid 1990s 
ethnic disturbances many NGOs expanded their focus to citizenship and ethnicity 
(Mohan, 2002).  Most NGOs working in northern Ghana now focus a majority of their 
activities on groups. There are many such associations: groups for agro-processing, 
revolving credit schemes with goats, groups for money literacy and income generation 
and so on.  Many of these programmes are focussed on women and some involve 
membership groups as large as 150.  
Central Ghana exhibits rather different local cultural, political and economic 
contexts from both northern Ghana and the coastal savannas.  Much of the central 
area  - notably the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions which form the Akan heartland 
- is richer than the north: it includes major maize and export cocoa producing zones, 
gold mining and timber production, and has more developed communications and 
infrastructure.  This is a region capable of substantial community mobilisation without 
external support, related to its history of opposition to central government and the 
tradition of demonstrating group support through funeral attendance (Dennis and 
Peprah, 1995).  NGO activity has been very limited in the region (Kyei, 1999) 
because donor support for interventions is focused on Ghana’s poorer districts. 
 Further contrast is offered by the coastal savanna region where there has also 
been little NGO involvement, despite the fact that there are considerable pockets of 
poverty.  There is much dependence here on semi-substance farming and artisanal 
fishing and some areas are arguably as poor as northern Ghana. In recent years a 
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number of donor-led initiatives have extended into this zone (which is facing serious 
environmental problems) and a few International NGOs which had previously 
concentrated on northern Ghana have begun to operate more extensively here.  
Additionally, quite a few local NGOs have come into existence, though by 
comparison with northern Ghana their numbers remain comparatively low.  Again, 
group-based activities have commonly been central to the development initiatives set 
in motion.    
    In the following section we draw attention to the diverse experiences of 
group formation in this latter region, the coastal zone, to show the way LDGs  appear 
to have been shaped by (and help shape further) interactions of local culture and 
political economy in individual places. While our discussion so far has shown how 
donors (and consequently both local and international NGOs - who mostly depend on 
donors for their survival) have adopted a uniform concept of cooperation in groups, 
the following section demonstrates how attempts to implement this aspatial blueprint 
have been rejected or adapted.     
 
Case study: Ghana's Village Infrastructure Project and Intermediate Means of 
Transport (IMTs) 
This case study emphasizes that even within regions, spatial differences in terms of 
rurality, distance from urban centres, local economy, history of government and donor 
intervention and ethnicity can influence the potential for LDGs to form and survive. 
The case study explores support for and resistance to group formation in a rural 
transport context and its effects on local development.  The broad donor development 
context is provided by the country-wide Village Infrastructure Project, established in 
the second half of the 1990s, which is described first.  The linked action research 
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project (led by one of the authors of this paper) involved the Ghana Ministry of 
Agriculture's Village Infrastructure Project Coordinating Unit as a collaborating 
institution. 
 The Village Infrastructure Project (VIP) is a World Bank funded programme 
focussed explicitly on rural community groups and associations in pilot locations 
across the country. Its design draws extensively on experience of infrastructure 
projects in other countries with no evidence of building on local forms of groups in its 
planning phase.  Project components include rural water infrastructure, rural transport 
(including village tracks and trails and Intermediate Means of Transport (IMTs) i.e. 
bicycles, push trucks, hand carts, motorcycles, power tillers etc.), post-harvest 
infrastructure (e.g drying facilities) and institutional strengthening focussed on the 
district assemblies. While previous programmes had relied more on existing groups, 
new groups could be eligible for assistance in this programme, providing they register 
formally and have “satisfactorily completed appropriate training in group dynamics 
and management through a partnership NGO”.  A further requirement is evidence of 
group savings at a “commercial bank”. 
 We focus here on those cases of groups in the Central Region buying 
Intermediate Means of Transport (IMTs) through the VIP.  From the outset, there 
have been identified problems around “group formation, dynamism and cohesion” in 
the VIP (Anchirinah and Yoder, 2000:ii), particularly in those cases where groups 
have been established for the purpose of receiving funds, and in those groups that 
share equipment and maintenance. There were many unsuccessful groups which 
failed to achieve any local improvements from the equipment supplied, because the 
group could not keep together to organize maintenance and servicing and it was often 
simply abandoned.  Successful groups were identified in the VIP where farmers had 
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established the groups themselves, such as nnoboa (joint farm labour) work groups 
  
Interviews with 150 farmers in two districts in Central Region for the related 
transport action research project (Porter, 2002; Porter, in press) similarly found a 
common view among both women and men that group ownership of equipment would 
only be feasible if members were drawn from the same family/household, because 
otherwise there would be too many disputes over the use of the equipment. Negative 
attitudes to groups focussed around potential quarrels: “I would not consider group 
ownership because…. it always includes quarrelling.” (young woman, Assin-
Aworabo).  “You would not get it [the IMT] whenever you need it” (woman, Gomoa-
Sampa).  Husbands tended to support this view, not wishing to see themselves drawn 
into village disputes: “if there is trouble arising she would come to me” (young 
husband, Aworabo). Indeed, in the subsequent implementation component of the 
action research when transport equipment was offered to villagers on credit, we found 
that only five pieces of IMT out of 70 were purchased by groups. One of these cases 
was in a small village (Gomoa-Abora), where most people are related and two groups 
purchased and managed equipment together. Moreover, the five groups have proved 
no faster than individuals in paying for their equipment.   When we held review 
meetings with villagers in the five villages after a 16-month monitoring period, four 
out of the five village reviews still came out strongly in favour of individual as 
opposed to group activities.   Four of the five villages, it should be noted, are villages 
away from a good paved road.  Only Gomoa-Abora, mentioned above, has a paved 
road (recently built).  This is a point to which we return later.  All were settlements 
located at some distance from the coast i.e. non-fishing settlements. 
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  Despite this apparent resistance to groups in Central Region, district 
assemblies and administrative officers in both the action research study districts have 
favoured group loans, specifically because of the pressure applied to defaulting 
individuals by the group.  They argue that loans to individuals are difficult because of 
the need for collateral and guarantors.  They are particularly positive about the 
reliability of women's groups in meeting repayments because of the application of 
sanctions.   VIP staff, meanwhile, argue that on a large project like VIP, groups are 
necessary, not just because of the size of the project, but in particular because VIP are 
focussing on the “poorest of the poor”, and individuals could not afford IMTs  
(meeting with VIP staff, Accra, March 2000).  At the same meeting, however, a 
Ministry of Agriculture representative from another department suggested that in the 
agro-processing field, individuals operated and managed the equipment better than 
groups, “although project staff find groups easier to manage”.    By August 2000, one 
of the two District Chief Executives from the study districts was expressing some 
disillusionment with group work in the VIP.  He was finding the VIP regulations 
regarding using long-standing groups operating their own account “too difficult” and 
suggested that the project would work better through individuals.  Essentially, very 
little had been achieved in his district, despite the availability of project funds, 
because groups could simply not be found.  
 When we subsequently held a workshop on our related action research project to review 
progress with a wider group of participants, academics, government staff and NGOs in July 2002, 
government and NGO attachment to groups was still strongly in evidence, despite the clearly expressed 
negative attitude of villagers to group formation for development projects: “formation of strong groups 
is needed” (staff member, Feeder Roads Department); “women's groups can guarantee credit… 
already existing women's groups can easily be contacted for the use of IMTs… women's groups can 
guarantee for credit facilities” (NGO regional project officer), “women's groups can influence others 
to use IMTs” (government officer), “women's groups are a force to be reckoned with.  They can easily 
move to NGOs for funding.  Repayment is guaranteed” (NGO staff member).  One small discussion 
group at the workshop listed the following group advantages (presented by a government staff 
member): “As a group, can influence one another to adopt the IMT;  can easily organise their 
members for training and education; can guarantee for credit and ensure repayment; as a unified front 
can easily approach local and international NGOs for support.”  At local government level, however, 
there was some expressed bemusement that groups were patently NOT working in Gomoa district.  
One district officer spoke out at the workshop in evident frustration: “Why can’t it work here with 
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groups?”  - he received no response.  The net result was that, since so few groups had been formed, the 
district could not achieve its targets for intervention under the VIP: development in this arena 
remained, essentially, on hold.   
 
Discussion: space, place and competing discourses around group formation  
Donor discourse has a powerful influence on countries like Ghana which  are heavily 
dependent on donor funding. As we have illustrated, the preoccupation with forming 
groups is found amongst both donors and NGOs and is supported by government. 
However, our review of the incidence of group formation in Ghana suggests 
important spatial distinctions in the extent to which dominant donor discourse around 
the value of groups for local development has been accepted or resisted by 
communities.  We have paid particular attention to coastal Ghana where resistance to 
prevailing donor discourse around the value of groups seems to be particularly strong 
and the net result has been wastage of funds which have been made available.due to 
rapid  group disintegration, capture of funds by individuals who have manipulated 
groups for their own ends, and a wider failure to gain access to the development funds 
which would otherwise be available to this region.  It is now useful to set this regional 
experience back in its broader national context, first focusing on local community 
attitudes and local context, then on NGO and donor perspectives at sub regional, 
regional and national scales. 
Community perspectives: 
 In order to understand patterns of resistance and compliance to donor discourse 
around groups in Ghana we need to consider a range of possible influencing factors, 
including specific agro-ecological conditions and their impact on prevailing 
livelihood opportunities and practices, related migration histories, the likely impact of 
remoteness, transport accessibility  and proximity to urban areas, varying histories of 
NGO  intervention, and other cultural factors which may predispose people to favour 
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or disfavour group action.  We do this for our three agro-ecological study regions in 
turn.   
 The widespread existence of active LDGs in northern Ghana appears logical in 
the context of that region’s relative remoteness, its associated lack of livelihood 
opportunities and its relatively long history (by Ghanaian standards) of NGO 
intervention.   In the many remote rural areas of this region (particularly those areas 
away from the paved road and without regular transport links to distant places), local 
inhabitants can usually build up detailed knowledge of one another: they are able to 
assess strengths and weaknesses, and to gauge the likelihood of family support and 
recompense in cases where trust in an individual proves misplaced.   In remoter, less 
accessible locations like this there is often more opportunity to build up the intimate 
knowledge of people’s personal circumstances and character which both enables trust 
and the power to impose sanctions.   Seasonal agricultural migrations may occur, but 
they tend to involve specific groups from specific places who return home at regular 
intervals.    Groups may thus work in these locations because individuals know what 
their fellow members are doing, and soon hear if they are facing financial problems 
which may cause them to renege on group commitments.  Knowing where people 
live, which church they attend, having frequent contact with or knowledge of other 
members of their family, can all help create confidence in the sustainability of a 
potential group enterprise.  In any case, transport is usually irregular and expensive, 
so a quick get-away by an individual wishing to escape group sanctions will be 
difficult to effect.  
 In this context, when an NGO arrives with the promise of largesse, and this is 
predicated on group formation, the pressure to cooperate will commonly be intense.  
If some livelihoods improve even marginally as a result – particularly those of more 
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powerful community members – the group is likely to be sustained, or at least a 
semblance of group action maintained whenever the potential for external assistance 
appears on the horizon. Given the shortage of other local options, benefits from the 
group become part of an overall livelihood strategy and there can be strong peer 
pressure on individuals to cooperate.  Additionally, in northern Ghana  there may be 
social (as opposed to economic) benefits for women from group formation since 
cultural constraints can limit their activities and travel to distant places: our research 
findings are supported by studies elsewhere showing that group operations may allow 
women a good excuse to meet and even occasional opportunities for travel to NGO 
offices at district and regional headquarters (Townsend et al., 1995).  
 In Brong Ahafo and Ashanti livelihood opportunities are far greater than in the 
northern regions and thus the imperative to form groups from this perspective seems 
lower.  However, there is much evidence in this region that groups have been a 
traditional component of the rural livelihoods repertoire.   Relationships are often 
built up carefully over time, especially in remoter rural areas, so that community 
mobilization, including associated group formation, is feasible.  Nnoboa groups, for 
instance, are formed by groups of farmers to undertake working parties at labour 
bottleneck periods, and many other groups may emerge from time to time.  Thus, 
although there has been much less NGO intervention in this region, because of its 
perceived comparative wealth, traditional group formation is common.  Consequently, 
when NGOs do intervene, we might hypothesise that interest in LDGs is likely to be 
sustained, especially in remoter rural areas.   
 In this respect, however, it is interesting to note the observations by Dennis 
and Peprah (1995:47) in Techiman, district capital of Brong Ahafo in central Ghana.  
They have recorded the crucial role of indigenous women’s trader associations in 
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Techiman market in allowing a massive expansion of the foodstuffs trade, noting the 
fluidity at the margins of these associations and the crucial importance of reputation 
and connections as an entry point.  They observe, “it will be difficult for externally 
funded women’s groups to replicate the flexibility and the range and depth of support 
provided for their members” by the Techiman market Yam Traders’ association and 
point out that externally established credit groups police their members and control 
their access to other organizations much more rigidly.  The setting up of processing 
groups which “do not have a commitment to socially support their members in times 
of crisis [in the way traditional Techiman trader associations do] raises questions 
about the possible contribution of such initiatives to sustainable income generation, 
and what supplementary networks may be necessary for poor women in more isolated 
communities…” (ibid: 48).  Their comments indicate that in the Brong Ahafo region, 
despite the existence of vibrant indigenous groups, externally funded interventions 
aimed at creating new groups are taking only a partial view of how traditional groups 
work.  Their conclusion (ibid: 48) is worth quoting in full:  “External funders may 
have learned the ‘wrong’ lesson from indigenous trading associations.  They have not 
replicated their wide social provision for members, but they have learned that it is 
less risky, and repayment rates are better, if credit is provided for trade rather than 
agricultural production, in spite of their stated objectives.  The development of 
appropriate strategies for providing support to non-traders and processors may be 
arrested by this focus.” This example shows the importance of understanding how 
people’s actions are embedded in their livelihood practices, and the need to recognize 
that livelihood practices, honed by local environmental and social conditions, have to 
be seen in the round: they include not only the economic component of income 
generation but the complex web of social networks, institutions, regulation and 
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individuals which supports it.  We will return to this issue of the divergent 
understanding of donors and communities regarding what group operations entail later 
in this section.   
 The coastal savanna zone, where much of our research was conducted, 
provides other lessons.  In more accessible areas, and particularly those areas close to 
major cities and in settlements along major highways, populations are fluid, people 
come and go with the farming and fishing seasons and according to other non-
seasonal opportunities which become available.  ‘Straddling’ the urban-rural divide 
has intensified as a feature of life in this part of Ghana since the first introduction of 
SAPs in 1983.  Group formation is likely to be more difficult in these more accessible 
locations within the coastal belt because individuals can far more easily disappear into 
a distant suburb or to another town where fellow group members and creditors cannot 
find them without considerable effort.  Although there is probably a tendency for 
urban proximity to undermine cooperation around Kumasi and other major towns in 
the central belt too (though less so in the north since the three regional capitals are 
relatively small), it seems to be a  particular feature in and around large coastal towns, 
especially the Accra-Tema conurbation.  It tends to take longer to build relationships 
of trust in these relatively mobile communities where, even if families are  well 
established, family identities are in a state of flux as individuals come and go, 
precisely because personal interactions are more diffuse and regularly interrupted by 
temporary migrations.  
 In addition to this broad pattern of rural-urban mobility there are substantial 
migrations of fishermen and their wives and families as the fishing fleets move up and 
down the West African coast – from Abidjan to Lagos and beyond.  Not only do these 
migrations further destabilize the potential for developing trust and sanctions; such 
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national and international migrations must also make it particularly difficult for the 
kind of spatially-based groups favoured by donors to become established and develop 
the necessary link to local NGOs in order to obtain funding for specific activities.    
Particular examples of group failure were given by villagers concerning susu (non-
formal rotational group saving and lending schemes).  In coastal fishing villages like 
Dogo in Gomoa district and Ada Foah in Dangbe East district this has turned many 
residents against group schemes in general (village interviews, January 1997).   It has 
possibly been a major cause of loss of trust in group enterprises among inhabitants of 
many other settlements in coastal Ghana .  
 Despite these problems, even in the coastal zone, groups may work in 
particular circumstances.  In the case study, family bonds were sufficiently strong to 
overcome the potentially disruptive influences of urban proximity and allow some 
group IMT purchase in one settlement.  The four other IMT study settlements were 
located inland, off the paved road (between 8 and 25 kms distant), on bad roads with 
relatively poor access to transport.  They thus might have been expected to provide 
contexts relatively favourable to cooperation.  However, the widespread reluctance to 
undertake NGO-promoted group activities among the Fanti, even in less accessible 
areas, may lie in regional historical experience of defaulting from groups described 
above.  As one NGO project officer put it, 'people analyse projects in the frame of 
their previous experience.' (discussion group, Accra, February 2001).  In some cases 
communities may not have suffered actual bad experiences, but the mere publicity 
that cases of abscondment receive often seems sufficient to deter moves towards 
group activity, despite pressures for group formation from NGO staff.   This 
reluctance may be encouraged by the greater self-reliance and choice that people have 
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due to the history of cash cropping in this region, as well as the lack of sanctions 
available to stop them.  
 
 NGO and donor perspectives:  
Spatial considerations are also important when reviewing NGO and donor 
perspectives on groups.  Although donor, government and NGO discourse about the 
need for communities to form groups had become ubiquitous across Ghana by the late 
1990s, that discourse had been promoted far longer in northern Ghana than southern 
Ghana.  Not only is NGO experience of working with LDGs better established in 
northern Ghana, some NGOs may themselves be less convinced about group potential 
in the south.  Despite the seeming reluctance to join groups in many Fanti coastal 
communities, it is true that most NGOs go along with donor requirements.  
Nonetheless, a lack of confidence in the approach was evident in discussions with 
some NGO staff and is well summarized by the following statement: “we 
[environmental NGO] recognise the need for groups - then translated to the 
individual level later.  We have to tell individuals to form a group because the work 
must be of community benefit.”  (Director, environmental NGO, Accra). Another 
environmental NGO working in southern Ghana has begun to move from a focus on 
community lands to family-lands in project development, recognising the diversity of 
interest within “communities”: this has led to a change from supplying community 
nurseries to supplying family holdings with trees. However, family group activities 
may fail to operate precisely because it is so difficult to impose harsh sanctions on 
deviant members or because they fail to address gender inequalities within the family 
(Molyneux, 2002).  Kin-based groups also, by definition, bar non-family members.   
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 However, donors fail to see how their interventions are being re-interpreted 
and how groups actually function in practice. Local gender relations, for instance may 
have a critical influence on group potential.  Most development groups tend to have a 
(mostly) unpaid executive  - leader, secretary, treasurer - which plays an important 
supervisory role.  In Ghana, as elsewhere in low income countries, most of the 
executive tends to be literate males: women may be excluded explicitly on the basis 
that they lack writing and accounting skills. This often then prevents women gaining 
equal benefits from group activities and may ultimately disadvantage group progress 
(Lyon, 2003) unless individual strong and committed women emerge as leaders.   
 Regarding required longevity; the local development group is commonly 
expected by donors to exist for a substantial period as a stable entity, through the 
(frequently slow) period of project planning and eventual inauguration to actual 
activities on the ground, to maintain its membership and its external alliances.  
Benefits may simply take too long to emerge, when measured against other livelihood 
options, and may have been misrepresented by NGOs and District staff or 
misconstrued by groups. Moreover, in Ghana's traditional non-formal groups there is 
often a tendency for non-kin based associations to shift membership, focus, rules and 
external alliances fairly rapidly in response to changing social, economic and political 
conditions in a way which is not anticipated by donors in LDGs.  This ties in with 
Dennis and Peprah’s concerns about attempts to promote LDGs in Techiman.  Similar 
dynamism and fluidity among non-formal groups has been observed in Tanzania (de 
Weerdt, 2001).   
 Decisions to cooperate in LDGs are shaped by both conscious calculation and 
habitual action, sometimes by unquestioning compliance or obedience.  Cleaver 
(2001:51) points out in a slightly different but related context, “non-participation and 
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non-compliance may be both a 'rational' strategy and an unconscious practice 
embedded in routine, social norms and the acceptance of the status quo”.  As our 
research shows, within groups the interplay of power and control in hierarchical 
relations, financial incentives/penalties, long-term reciprocity and the role of tradition 
is likely to be dependent in very considerable part on specific prevailing socio-cultural 
conditions in particular places.   'Rules of the game' have to be established and this 
takes time: groups initiated by donors are focussed on the benefits of association.   
 As local participants  - district authorities, implementing NGOs and group 
members themselves - may recognise, the crucial factor ultimately is likely to be the 
power of surveillance and censure, but this component may be the one most difficult 
to graft artificially.  Indeed, particular problems in a development context seem to 
stem from donor’s inadequate conceptualisation of sanctions in theorising around 
social capital and the potential of group action.  As we have illustrated in our case 
study, grass-roots development workers are often far more aware than donors that 
group enterprises involve relationships which may incur social costs both for 
members and for non-members: peer pressure, loss of trust, and exclusion of the 
poorest and most vulnerable.  It is not necessarily a win-win scenario and while direct 
and indirect costs (time, money, materials, argument etc.) are likely to be incurred at 
an early stage, direct and indirect benefits (income, information, facilities etc.) may 
take some years to become visible (Weinberger and Jutting, 2001).  Again, as our 
regional review has emphasized, the ability to impose sanctions is likely to vary 
spatially, with urban proximity causing particular potential difficulties (an observation 
supported by Freidberg (2001) with reference to problems of collaboration around 
Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso).  
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 Aryeetey and Appiah (1995:4) reviewing some informal associations in Ghana 
make the point that the survival of groups seems very dependent on “the extent to 
which prevailing local norms and values regarding group formation and action are 
taken into account”.  Our findings similarly suggest there are specific cultural factors 
at work which will constrain or encourage group formation and operations and that 
these both exhibit and reflect spatiality.  This conclusion echoes much earlier work by 
Lewis (1976) which drew similar attention to spatio-cultural factors in group 
formation in Ivory Coast.  
 These cultural norms (such as reciprocity, keeping verbal agreements, 
obedience to particular types of authority) differ not only between countries and agro-
ecological regions, but may vary within individual regions between urban and rural 
areas, and according to wealth, educational level, gender, and past experience of 
group activities.  Activities are firmly embedded in local, spatially specific, cultural 
(and politico-economic) conceptions and attitudes: these may bring intra-group 
solidarity or they may encourage contestation and disharmony. There are often  thus  
fundamental disjunctions between what donors expect  of groups and what groups can 
be realistically expected to achieve (in specific cultural, economic and political 
contexts) and between donor and grass-roots perspectives on how groups will operate 
on the ground.  However, the net development result of failures at group formation 
and associated rapid disbursement of funds in coastal Ghana is probably to further 
encourage concentration of development funds in northern Ghana, where there is 
greater willingness to work in groups according to donor requirements. 
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Conclusion: social capital, groups and the West African context  
This paper has shown that there are well established discourses concerning 
promotion of group activities that are highly attractive to donors and are underpinned 
by interpretations of flexible concepts such as social capital. These discourses have 
considerable power over policy interventions, particularly in countries such as Ghana 
which are highly dependent on donor funding  
Our empirical study of a World Bank sponsored development project in Ghana 
shows that in practice donor discourses are re-interpreted, translated and even rejected 
by different players, operating at different spatial scales. Space, place and cultural 
context, through their interplay with local political economy, have been important in 
shaping the potential for LDG formation in Ghana and the subsequent achievements 
of LDGs.  Groups seem to work better in areas of central and northern Ghana than in 
the coastal zone, though for different reasons. We suggest that in the north it is lack of 
alternative livelihood opportunities and long-standing work by some NGOs which has 
favoured group formation and survival, whereas in the Akan heartland of Brong 
Ahafo and Ashanti, group mobilisation is more a reflection of communitarian 
sympathies and tradition, rather than external intervention.   It is important, however, 
to recognize the limitations of many of these indigenous organizations when 
remodeled by donor interventions.  In parts of coastal Ghana (and probably 
elsewhere) the requirement for pre-formed groups and working through groups may 
be actually diverting development efforts by local NGOs away from assistance to 
those individuals and traditional non-formal groups most needful of support.   
 There are now many examples across Ghana – including northern Ghana - of 
projects not meeting their expected outcomes as membership of formal groups decline 
when the subsidies from NGOs are removed.  Such groups typically attract those who 
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are primarily interested in the subsidy, rather than in pursuing cooperative enterprises.  
Problems usually ensue rapidly around the issue of ownership and the responsibilities 
of group members.  In part, this may be due to the common focus on rapid group 
formation, given numerical targets among donors keen to achieve rapid disbursement 
of funds without adequate attention to the potential for sanctions to operate and keep 
groups in order.  The issue of group ownership and action is one which thus needs 
much more careful consideration.   
 As we have illustrated, the preoccupation with forming groups is found 
amongst both donors and NGOs.  It could be argued that elite-based NGOs may be 
helping to delude both donors and grassroots constituencies, in their desire to obtain 
donor funding.  There appears to be a common attitude that, if donors want groups, 
then let them have them, whether appropriate or not.  Groups in such cases provide 
little more than a rhetoric of local control and bottom up participatory development: 
the end result may be to waste development funds and to further distract and 
disillusion those poor communities which have been subjected to development.  This 
ties in with Tvedt's view (1998) that strengthening NGOs may actually serve to 
weaken civil society.  Despite some individuals within NGOs questioning the 
preoccupation with groups, there is an overwhelming lack of attention to the way 
NGOs, local government and the groups they sustain and support are individually 
embedded in their local contexts, in place and space. NGO activities are strongly 
donor driven in Ghana, however, so the tendency to work principally through groups 
in the same standard approach without considering spatial differences continues. 
 The concept of ‘the group’ may make local development more manageable for 
outsiders: less messy, more controllable, less prone to individual whim and defection 
since the group is responsible for the conduct of its individual members.  It provides a 
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counterfoil to accusations of high-handedness, lack of participation.  But in adopting 
the rhetoric of the group, donors have become inflexible in new ways.  The ‘group’ 
concept has been removed from its local embeddedness in what Bebbington (2000) 
refers to as ‘livelihood practices’ and reconstituted as a development tool for universal 
application.  Not surprisingly, the take up and impact of group activities has been 
highly variable.   Local people in particular places, subjected to new definitions of 
what group membership entails and the benefits it may or may not confer, will react in 
different ways, according to the potential within their current livelihood practices and 
resources to incorporate this new opportunity and in accordance with their historical 
experiences.  If it suits them, even in the very short term, they may run with it.  In 
many cases, as our review of coastal Ghana indicates, they run with it at most only so 
long as easily accessed benefits can be extracted and before any long-term problems 
kick in.  If the likelihood of punishment for non-payment of loans etc. is too high, 
however, for instance in areas proximate to large population concentrations so that 
group members can easily defect without detection, or there is a highly mobile 
population as in the case of fishing settlements, the carrot offered by group 
membership will probably be insufficient to outweigh the dangers of loss.  Local 
NGOs will try to persuade communities that there is potential benefit in membership 
of a group, because they themselves are judged and rewarded on their ability to 
deliver numbers.   In remote rural areas of northern Ghana, where local livelihood 
options are highly restricted, donor groups represent one of the few opportunities to 
improvement, and NGOs have proved their worth in the past as one of the few routes 
available to accessing external resources within the region, the NGO-run group is 
more likely to be joined and, even if the benefits are only marginal, adopted longer 
term.    
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 Finally, we must to return to the broader issues around the common 
donor attachment to building social capital through group activities, and their seeming 
lack of attention to space and place, and to ask a more basic question  
Are groups seen by many donors, not merely in terms of their practical advantages, as 
a means of disbursing funds rapidly with some semblance of equity, and the 
likelihood of achieving adequate accountability, but also in social engineering terms? 
We have linked donor emphasis on groups in Ghana in this paper to donor 
conceptualizations of a homogenous Ghanaian culture, rich in associational life, 
which is ripe for enhancement through local development group action. But this 
cultural misreading is arguably only part of the story.  It could be viewed as an 
important component in a deliberate attack on 'community' as traditionally 
constituted: a contribution to an emerging system of global governance (Hearn, 1999; 
Townsend et al., 1999: 49, Porter, 2003).  Peck and Tickell (2002: 390) propose that 
there has been “selective appropriation” of “community”, social capital discourses 
and “the mobilization of the ‘little platoons’ in the shape of (local) voluntary and 
faith-based associations”: part of a “deliberate stretching of the neoliberal policy 
repertoire” with linkages to complex extensions of national state power through 
devolution and decentralisation.  This is a reading which those working in Ghana and 
other heavily donor-dependent countries at least need to ponder.  If it is correct, we 
should not expect donors to become more responsive to space, place and cultural 
context.  
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